The Original Canadian "Spies of the Airwaves"

The Untold Story of Number 1 Canadian Special Wireless Section Type "B"

Canadian Special Wireless "Scoop" Warns of Elite German Armoured Counterattack

Signalman Ron Gates was on duty in the intercept van that eventful night. At approximately 2100 hours. the German wireless nets went on listening watch for the night. "It was so quiet it was eerie".

At 2300 hours a massive artillery barrage announced the start of the Allied attacks.

"The German nets quickly came active in response. As the crushing arti1lery fire continued the Canadian Special Wireless operators were able to make numerous interceptions in plain language Morse code or in plain voice, which were quickly patched to the Intelligence van for exploitation."

However, the sources of many of these transmissions were from German units in contact along the front line. The Canadian operators continually tried to pick up any indication of the move of reserve German units that could potentially stop the Allied advance.

By the 16th of May, the first line of defences, the Gustav Line, was breached and the German troops were streaming back to the next line of defence, the Hitler Line, straddling the Liri Valley. At this point, the 8th Army Commander, Sir Oliver Leese, ordered the Canadian Corps to pursue the retreating Germans and breach the formidable Hitler Line before they had time to properly occupy their defences. Their attack up the Liri valley was focused on seizing the Italian town of Pontecorvo. Unfortunately, the Germans were able to occupy their well-camouflaged defences in front of the Canadian advance and ruthlessly stopped the Canadian's hasty attack.

After a three-day pause for preparations, the 1st Canadian Division launched a deliberate attack up the narrow Liri Valley behind a massive artillery barrage. A half-hour later the Americans launched their long awaited breakout from the Anzio beachhead, south of Rome, hoping to cut-off the German troops locked in battle with the Canadians. As the Canadians advanced they took heavy casualties in the Division's hardest day of fighting in the Italian campaign. The success of the operation hung in the balance throughout the day. In desperation, the Germans ordered the Herman Goering Division to counter-attack southward during daylight in the hopes of avoiding detection, despite the Allied's air supremacy.

It was during this critical period of the battle that Signalman Ed Marten intercepted a message from the Herman Goering Division indicating that it was on the move. He quickly recognized the significance of the message and relayed it to the Intelligence van. The Intelligence operators quickly passed the message up to Corps HQ who rapidly informed Mediterranean Allied Air Force; while disguising the source of the Information.

The early warning of the move of this elite German Panzer Division allowed for the rapid concentration of all available fighters and fighter-bombers. The Herman Goering Division was subjected to relentless low-level attacks causing considerable losses. The result was that it took them three days to reach the front. Leaving behind a litter of blackened twisted wrecks of tanks, trucks, guns and troop carriers. The threat to the Canadians had been stopped in its tracks!

Ed Marten's intercept had caused a chain of events that possibly saved many Canadian lives. Due to the secrecy surrounding the unit, Ed Marten received no official recognition for his actions. Even today, the fact that a Canadian Army Special Wireless (SW) unit was responsible for making the initial warning of this potentially deadly counter-attack has never been recorded.

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