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One supreme value of signals intelligence is that it is a short road into the mind of others. One reads what the originator actually says and what, for the purposes of his own, he is transmitting to others. Experience in war has demonstrated that wireless intelligence is one of the most important sources of secret information.1In December 1945 the newly appointed Chief of the General Staff, General Charles Foulkes, articulated his strong sentiments regarding the value of wireless intelligence in a confidential memorandum to the Canadian government entitled "A proposal for the Establishment of a National Intelligence Organization." 2 In essence this work, which contributed to the development of a framework for Canadian Intelligence in the early post-War environment, served as witness to the Canadian intelligence efforts - particularly 'wireless' - of the past six years. General Foulkes' testimony was certainly heartfelt; he had been on the receiving end of such 'wireless' intelligence as Commander of both the 2nd Canadian Division and the First Canadian Corps in North-West Europe immediately prior to and following the invasion of France in June 1944. But the memorandum does little to illuminate the efforts of the various Canadian 'Special Wireless' (S.W.) organizations to whom he covertly pays tribute, whose soldiers 'served in silence' in Canada and abroad between 1939-46. 3 Although an undetermined amount of information regarding 'S.W.' or 'Y' operations during the war remains outside of the public domain, there is enough material now available to provide substantial insight into the Canadian Army's SIGINT effort in the Second World War: this paper is an attempt to do so.  ContentsBackgroundCanada Europe The Pacific Conclusion Endnotes References | ||||||
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