The Task

Tasks could, and did, change daily especially during the first weeks of the operation. UNIFIL was initially established as a force of 4,000. This number grew to 6,000 by the 1st of June but with no immediate increase in the strength of CANSIGS. Consequently, Unit tasks were juggled and refined in response to the operational requirements. The following list of Unit tasks showing effective dates demonstrates that what the Unit did was not entirely what had been planned for it to do.

1. UNIFIL Communications - Voice Command/ Force Message Net, Logistics Net and Air Ground Net (see figures below):
   1. UNIFIL HQ (Control Stations) (Naqoura) 28 Apr
   2. FRENCHBATT (Haris) 28 Apr
   3. Forward Logistics Base (Zahrani) 28 Apr - 14 May
   4. NEPBATT (Blate) 28 Apr
   5. SWEDCOY (Replaced by NIBATT) (Srifa) 28 Apr - 13 May
   6. IRANCOY (Subsequently lRANBATT) (Quallawiyah) 28 Apr
   7. SENBATT (Marake) 28 Apr
   8. NORBATT (Ebel Es Saqi) 29 Apr
   9. NORAIR- (Naqoura) 10 May
   10. NIBATT (Kam Al Jall) 13 May
   11. *IRISHBATT (Tibnin) 13 May
   12. *Force Reserve (Red Alert) (Naqoura) 25 May
   13. *FIJIBATT (Qana) 6 Jun
   14. *Tyre Guard (Tyre) 20 Jun
   15. *FRENCHENGCOY (Jwayya) 8 Jul
   16. *Lebanese Army (Kaoukaba) 1-4 Aug
2. UNIFIL HQ Telephone Switchboard Service (Naqoura) 29 Apr
3. Signals Despatch/ Air Despatch Service Naqoura) 29 Apr
4. *Operations/Force Team Net (Figures 4 & 5) (Naqoura) 29 Apr
5. Canadian Rear Link (Naqoura) (Figure 6) 29 Apr
6. *Local Defence and Perimeter Security (Naqoura) 28 Apr
7. Maintenance -First and Second Line for communication equipment. First and some Second Line for vehicles and generators (Naqoura) 28 Apr
8. *Feeding UNIFIL HQ Staff (all ranks) (Naqoura) 1 Jun - 18 Jul

So it was. The original plan served to get the Unit on the ground (to the Start Line). From then on there was a job to do -get on with it! Vehicles and equipment were "borrowed" compliments of the Chief Signal Officer, LCol Lackonick, and his Chief Comm Op, WO Burtoft. Detachments were reduced in numbers to man the extra equipment. It was not a matter of "can do". It was simply a matter of satisfying the operational requirements of the Force Commander to the best of the Unit's abilities and capabilities.

But the Unit was seriously undermanned. There were only two cooks on establishment. There were two vehicle technicians to maintain vehicles, some of which had been sent to the Middle East from Canada in 1973. Numbers, of course, do not tell the complete story. Two cooks, for example, may appear to be an adequate number for a small unit. However, consider the job they had to perform. MCpl MacDonald and Cpl (later MCpl) Wallet were required to feed the fifty- odd personnel normally stationed at Camp Pearson. On 1 June this number doubled when the Unit was required to feed up to 50 personnel from UNIFIL HQ. But preparing meals was only part of their task. There was no approved ration scale for UNIFIL - this was produced. There was no ration supply system until 10 July - trips were made daily to the local supermarket in Nahariya, Israel where shopping carts were filled with the Unit's needs. Rations had to be of the type and quantity that could be apportioned between the deployed detachments and the main kitchen. All had to be accounted for. Notwithstanding the problems, the Unit was fed, and fed well. As a reward the cooks were given Sunday mornings off. Sunday brunch was an individual responsibility - cook it yourself.

The UNIFIL Message Net utilized VHF AN/GRC-46/49 voice equipments dismounted and operated in buildings or tents. Formal message traffic was passed, each message being typed on multi-copy paper by the operator as he received it. This net proved to be a reliable system, passing 5925 formal messages and a good number of collective call voice conversations.

The UNIFIL Logistics Net was originally established using AN/GRC-106 and AN/PRC-47 HF radios utilizing long wire antennae. Due to high noise, users were reluctant to use the facility to its fullest potential. Most traffic was informal voice conversations. The net was changed to VHF when AN/VRC-46-49 equipments became available, then subsequently replaced with Motorola commercial equipment. The net passed 917 formal messages and numerous voice conversations.

The Air-Ground-Air Net utilized AN/VRC-46 VHF, AN/GRC 106 HF and AN/PRC-66 UHF equipments. Norwegian helicopters experienced many problems with built-in VHF equipment and at one point used AN/PRC-25 sets strapped to the helicopter to provide VHF communications. There were also French helicopters in the area; however, no compatible communications equipment existed between French and Norwegian aircraft, and/or the ground airfield.

The UNIFIL Operations Net was a Motorola equipment net operating just below the 50 MHz range. Once established to all battalions, this net replaced the Logistics Net. The equipment proved to be quite dependable, however, very prone to jamming and intrference.

The UNIFIL Motorola Net was a fixed VHF/UHF system depending on commercial Motorola equipment and repeater towers and microwave circuits for distance. This net was widely used and often became the target for PLO jamming or tower damage. Since approximately 100 Motorola equipped UN cars were hijacked by the PLO, voice security and clear channels were non-existent.

The Canadian Rear Link: utilized AN/GRC-142A on-line crypto protected circuit with off-line crypto capabilities operating at 60 wpm. Initial problems were encountered when it was realized that Ismailia runs at 66 wpm and is not compatible therefore to normal Canadian CRTTZ configurations. Rear link circuit passed a total of 2046 formal messages.